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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we revisit the issue of the impact of demographic change on the Japanese saving-
investment balance. Using updated government projections, we show that the ageing of the 
population under way will steadily lower Japan's saving rate from 31 per cent of GDP today to 
20 per cent of GDP in 2040. Japan's investment rate will remain close to its current level of 29 
per cent. Thus, Japan's saving-investment balance, or current account, will steadily decrease 
from its current level and will turn negative in 2025. In addition, we project the impact of 
demographic change on the evolution of Japanese consumption per capita, or 'living standards.' 
Despite the population ageing, we project that per-capita consumption will grow until 2010. 
However, under certain scenarios, consumption per capita falls in most years after 2010. 
I. Introduction. 
Japan's saving and investment rates are among the highest in the world, and these rates 
have played a valuable role throughout the postwar period. The high savings has provided the 
funds needed to finance corporate investment in plant and equipment during the high-growth era 
of the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, and helped meet capital shortages abroad during the post-
1973 era of stable growth. The high investment has allowed Japan to incorporate the latest 
technologies into its production process, and has raised living standards through better public 
infrastructure, both in cities and in rural areas. However, there are some who blame Japan's high 
saving rate for her massive net export surpluses, leading to trade friction with her neighbors. 
Some also claim that Japanese firms are "overinvesting," that the returns to capital are abysmally 
low, and that government infrastructure investment is determined mostly by political 
considerations and inefficiently allocated. 
Over the next several decades, Japan's population will be aging rapidly. In 1955, only 5.5 
percent of the population was 65 years or older; by 1998, 16.2 percent were elderly. Projections 
imply large increases in the elderly in the next 20 years; by 2015,25 percent of the population 
will be 65 or above. The main reason for this aging is the fall in the total fertility rate (births per 
family). The total fertility rate was more than 4 before 1949, declining sharply to 2.1 in 1957. It 
has begun to fall again since 1974 and the current level of 1.4 was reached in 1997. There is still 
little sign that the total fertility rate has stabilized or has returned to a higher level. 
In this paper, we revisit the issue of the impact of demographic change on the Japanese 
saving-investment balance. There is widespread public belief that this rapid aging of the 
Japanese population-Japan's demographic destiny-will lead to major shifts in the Japanese 
saving-investment balance. We show that this belief is largely true. Using updated government 
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demographic projections, we show that the rapid aging of the population currently underway will 
steadily lower Japan's saving rate from 31 percent of GDP today to 20 percent of GDP in 2040. 
Japan's investment rate will remain close to its current level of 29 percent. Thus, Japan's saving-
investment balance, or current account, will steadily decrease from its current level, and will turn 
negative in 2025. 
In addition, we project the impact of demographic change on the evolution of Japanese 
consumption per capita, or "living standards." In carrying out the projections, we adopt two 
approaches. In the first approach, we assume that consumers are "naive" and base their 
consumption only on current income. In the second approach, we assume that consumers are 
"forward-looking" and base their consumption on both current and future income. Thus, in the 
second approach, consumption can be detached from current income; households adjust their 
saving to keep consumption growth constant into the future. The two approaches project very 
different consumption per capita growth rates. For example, under the first approach, the aging 
population drags down income growth, and consumption per capita declines by close to -2 
percent per year between 2010 and 2020. However, under the second approach, households bring 
their saving rate down to keep their consumption growth rate constant at 1.2 percent per year 
between 2010 and 2020. 
Besides its effect on the saving-investment balance and consumption per capita, Japan's 
aging population is expected to impose unprecedented stress on the public pension system. As 
the ratio of the elderly, who receive social security, to the working population rises, payroll tax 
rates are expected to surge to between 22 and 39 percent of gross annual wages by 2030 
(Takayama, 1998, p. 54). Takayama (1998) recommends that social security benefits be cut, and 
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that the earliest age of pension eligibility be raised. In this paper, we will not directly address the 
impact of aging on public pensions. However, in several sections, we briefly discuss the impact 
of aging on the government fiscal balance. 
Most of the earlier literature projecting the impact of demographic change on the 
Japanese saving-investment balance dates back over a decade. Horioka (1991,1992) estimates 
that Japanese private saving will become -15 percent by 2020. With regards to government 
saving, Masson and Tryon (1990) find that between 2000 and 2025, the budget deficit will 
deteriorate by 1.6 percentage points, owing to increasing pension burdens. Noguchi (1989) finds 
that the aging will cause the ratio of investment to GDP to decline until 2015, and increase 
thereafter. The primary reason for the decline is the fall in the working-age population and the 
resultant decline in the labor force. Noguchi's results further indicate that between 2000 and 
2015, the decline in the investment rate will exceed that in the saving rate, but from 2015, the 
decline in the saving rate will exceed that in the investment rate. 
Our paper differs from the earlier literature in the following ways. First, we use the latest 
data available on official demographic projections and the saving and investment rates. The 
earlier work was done over a decade ago and the data are correspondingly over a decade old. 
Second, we allow future population growth rates and support ratios (the ratio of the labor force to 
the population) to change every five years. The earlier literature assumed future population 
growth rates that are constant. Our approach, thus, allows for the simulation of more realistic 
evolutions of the age structure of the population. Finally, while the earlier projections were 
based on ad hoc behavioral assumptions, our projections are grounded in well-accepted micro-
economic behavior. 
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This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly review the literature on and 
past trends in Japanese saving and investment rates. In Section III, we assess the coming burden 
of the aged on per capita consumption and investment rates, assuming "naive" consumers and no 
international lending (closed economy). In Section IV, we allow for international lending, and 
"forward-looking" optimizing households. We simulate this model for realistic parameter values 
and demographic changes, and study the implications of the model for optimal investment rates, 
saving rates, consumption growth per capita, and the current account-GDP ratio. Section V 
concludes. 
II. Post-war Japanese Saving and Investment. 
It is well-known that the postwar Japanese economy is characterized by very high saving 
and investment rates. In fact, Japan's saving rates are among the highest in the world-only Italy, 
Singapore, and Taiwan have higher saving rates. However, these high Japanese saving and 
investment rates are primarily a postwar phenomenon-in fact a post-195 5 phenomenon. If the 
period of the Korean War is excluded, Japan's saving rate did not make it into the double digits 
until 1955, a full ten years into the postwar period. Thus, we can immediately reject the view 
that Japan's high saving rate is the result of cultural factors such as national character or 
Confucian and Buddhist teachings, because although cultural factors were stronger in the pre-war 
period, the saving rate was lower. 
The trends and fluctuations in Japanese saving and investment rates closely mirror the 
trends and fluctuations in Japanese GDP. Figure 1 depicts the association between Japanese total 
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saving and investment rates and the growth in Japanese GDP. For both saving and investment 
rates, there is clear positive association with the growth in GDP, especially until 1975. The 
broad trends in postwar Japanese private and government saving rates, investment rates, and the 
net export surplus-GDP ratios, are depicted in Table l.12 
The private saving rate rose steadily between 1955 and the mid-1970s, peaking (first) in 
1978. Subsequently, the rate fell until the early 1990s, when it rose (again) to reach its postwar 
peak in 1998. There is a voluminous literature that seeks to explain the pattern and level of 
Japanese postwar private saving.3 The literature suggests that the most important reason for 
Japan's high private saving rate is rapid economic growth. The permanent income/life cycle 
hypothesis can explain the positive impact of income growth on the private saving rate if income 
growth was faster than expected. This hypothesis may have been valid until the early 1970s. The 
surge in private saving from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s is related to the two oil crisis in the 
1970s. The explanation given is that the oil crisis added further fuel to the already rampant 
inflation and precipitated a recession, which in turn caused an increase in uncertainty about the 
1
 We depict gross saving and investment. Gross savings includes the depreciation on 
capital. In this paper, we use "gross", instead of "net" savings because the latter requires data on 
depreciation. There is enormous controversy regarding the proper measurement of capital 
depreciation rate in Japan, and the use of "gross" saving allows us to sidestep this controversy 
(Dekle and Summers, 1991; Hayashi, 1991; Horioka, 1995). 
2The private sector includes households, private unincorporated non-financial enterprises, 
and corporations. Corporate saving is small in Japan, and if households "pierce the corporate 
veil," corporate saving can be considered part of household saving. The government sector 
includes the central, prefectural, and local governments. Government saving excludes 
government investment, which are included in total investment. 
3See Horioka (1990), Dekle (1993), and Hayashi (1998) for a catalogue of reasons for 
Japan's high private saving. 
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future and increased the perceived need to save for precautionary purposes. The fall in private 
saving from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s is because of robust consumption, stimulated by 
rising stock and land prices. In contrast, the mid- to late-1990s rise in private saving is related to 
the recessionary economy, increase in unemployment, uncertainty and pessimism, all raising the 
perceived need for precautionary saving. Horioka (1991,1992) finds that the level and growth of 
Japanese GDP explains about 65 percent of the variation in the private saving rate.4 
The literature suggests that the second most important reason for Japan's high private 
saving rate is the favorable age structure of the population. Until the early 1970s, the proportion 
of the aged (over 65) to the working age population (20-64)-the so-called "dependency 
ratio"-was low in Japan. According to the life-cycle hypothesis, an increase in the dependency 
ratio has a significant negative effect on the private saving rate. Horioka (1991, 1992) finds that 
adding the dependency ratio to the equation already including the level and growth of GDP raises 
the proportion of private saving explained from 65 percent to 75 percent. Moreover, Horioka 
estimates that a one percentage point increase in the dependency rate will cause the private 
saving rate to decline by 1.0 percentage points. These and similar estimates suggest that the 12 
percentage point increase in the dependency rate between 1975 and 1998 has depressed private 
saving by about 12 percentage points annually. 
The government saving rate rose until the mid-1960s, then gradually fell to its historical 
low in 1978. Subsequently, the rate rose (again) until the early 1990s, when it started to decline 
to (almost) its new low in 1998. The trend in Japanese government saving is also closely related 
4Horioka's results, however, must be interpreted with caution, since he includes variables 
with different orders of integration, I(.), in the same estimating equation. His demographic 
variables are 1(2), but the level and growth of GDP are 1(0), and 1(1), respectively. 
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to economic growth. Government saving surged until the mid-1960s as growth rates were 
consistently above government projections, leading to rising tax revenues. From the mid-1960s, 
however, the demand for government services increased, dampening the budget surpluses. The 
recessionary 1970s led to counter-cyclical measures and a further drop in government saving. To 
halt the decline in government saving, the Japanese government in the early 1980s introduced 
budget freezes and reformed the tax system. These measures and strong economic growth in the 
mid- to late-1980s led to rising budget surpluses. However, as the economy tanked in the early 
1990s, falling tax revenues and the need for expansionary fiscal policy again depressed 
government saving rates. 
The investment rate also rose steadily, peaking in 1973. Since then, it has fallen slightly. 
Compared to household and government saving rates, the investment rate has remained 
comparatively stable. The main determinant of the Japanese investment rate has again been 
economic growth.5 As GDP growth surged in the 1950s and 1960s, Japanese investment was 
able to grow to take advantage of newly available technologies. Since the early 1970s, the 
investment rate has dipped somewhat, but has remained at a high level. The surge in investment 
rates in the late 1980s is related to the cheap financing available to firms, due to rising stock and 
land prices. Although private investment has dipped in the 1990s, rising government investment 
owing to expansionary public works projects in the mid- to late 1990s has kept overall 
investment rates high. 
Japanese net exports were in persistent deficit until the early 1970s, reflecting strong 
5Kiyotaki and West (1996) find that Japanese private plant and equipment investment 
between 1961 and 1994 can be well explained by the "flexible accelerator" model, with lagged 
output as the sole explanatory variable. 
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investment demand, but inadequate saving. However, by the mid-1980s, the surge in saving and 
decline in investment pushed Japanese net export surpluses (as a percentage of GDP) into record 
territory. Subsequently, as a result of strong domestic consumption in the late-1980s and strong 
government investment in the 1990s, the net export surpluses (as a percentage of GDP) declined. 
III. Aging: The Impact on Consumption Per Capita, and Total Saving and Investment 
The economic consequences of population aging depend on the nature of underlying 
demographic change as well as the relationship between the resource needs of individuals of 
different ages. This section presents our estimates of the economic burden of increased 
dependency, as well as the impact of population aging on total saving (investment) rates, 
assuming for now, that Japanese saving equals investment (closed economy). 
Changing Demographic Structure 
Figure 2 plots the Japanese government's projections of the Japanese total population and 
the percentage of the total population that is elderly.6 The total Japanese population is expected 
to peak at close to 130 million in 2005, then gradually decline to about 100 million by about 
2050. The percentage of the population over age 65 has grown rapidly, especially since 1980, 
and now stands at about 15 percent. By 2020, the percentage should approach 25 percent, and by 
2050, 33 percent. By 2030, the percentage of the very old (age over 80) should exceed 10 
6The figures for 1955 to 1998 were calculated from data presented in the Prime Minister's 
Office (various years). The figures from 1999 to 2050 were calculated from the medium 
projections of the population by age group presented in Ministry of Health and Welfare (various 
years). 
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percent. These Japanese rates of population aging are much higher than in other countries. For 
example, in the U.S., only about 15 percent of the population will be above age 65 by 2025. 
Declining fertility is the principal source of the changing demographic patterns.7 In the 
years following World War II, the total fertility rate in Japan rose to about 4 by 1950. Fertility 
sharply declined during the 1970s and 1980s, from 2.1 per household in 1974 to 1.4 per household 
in 1997. The total fertility rate is projected to decline to about 1.2 over the next several decades. 
Moreover, Japan has allowed almost no immigrants, who, especially in English speaking 
countries, have helped keep the population young. These trends have important implications for 
the demographic structure of the population over the next half-century. 
The Support Ratio 
Demographic shifts affect the economy's consumption opportunities because they change 
the relative sizes of the self-supporting and dependent populations. Following Cutler, Poterba, 
Sheiner, and Summers (1990), we summarize these changes by the support ratio, denoted by a , 
which we define as the effective labor force, LF, divided by the effective number of consumers, 
CON, 
a = LF/CON. 
The first issue in measuring the support ratio concerns the relative consumption needs of 
people at different ages. We assume that all people have identical resource needs so that: 
i = i N i ' 
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where Ni is the number of people of age i. 
The second issue concerns the effective labor force. The first measure, LF1, assumes that 
all people aged 20-64 are in the labor force, while individuals 19 and under or 65 and over are not: 
Z 64 Ni . i=20 
This measure is used by the Japanese government in projecting the future labor force. 
The second measure, LF2, recognizes that both human capital and labor force participation 
rates vary by age. We use data on the average 1990 earnings of people of each age (measured in 
five-year intervals) and sex (Wij, where i is age, and j= M, male or F, female), along with data on 
age and sex specific labor force participation rates ( PRij ):8 
LF2 = £ 8 ° (WiM*PRM*NiM + Wiw*PRiw*Niw^ 
This measure assumes that earnings accurately reflect a worker's human capital. If age-earnings 
profiles are hump-shaped, then labor productivity peaks in middle-age. Thus, this measure 
recognizes that the human capital of a society with a high fraction of people in middle age is 
higher than that of a society with many older workers, whose earnings and labor force 
participation rates decline. 
The two support ratios using the two measures of the labor force are reported in Figure 3. 
The two support ratios have very similar patterns, especially after 1995. Using LF1, the support 
ratio declines from 1 in 1990 to 0.80 in 2050. Using LF2, the support ratio declines from 1 in 
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1990 to 0.78 in 2050. Between 2005 and 2030, the second support ratio declines more than the 
first, owing to the fall in high earning, prime age males. Given the similarity in the two support 
ratios, for the remainder of this paper, we focus on the first support ratio (LF1). 
Shifting Dependency Burdens and Consumption per Capita. 
This section explores how the demographic shifts described above affect the economy's 
level of capital accumulation and sustainable level of consumption. Here for simplicity, we 
assume that the Japanese economy is closed so that total saving equals investment, and that the 
economy is continuously in the steady-state. Alternatively, households are "naive" and simply 
consume a fraction of their current income. In Section IV, we relax these assumptions, and allow 
for international lending, and time for transitioning between one steady state and another. 
Demographic change has two offsetting effects on consumption opportunities. An increase 
in dependency, or fall in a lowers output per person. When dependency increases, the number of 
workers falls more rapidly than the total population. Thus, each person is left with less output. 
Offsetting this effect, however, is that investment requirements are reduced by the slower labor 
force growth, thus allowing more output for consumption. As the number of workers fall, the 
need to equip workers with capital equipment declines, reducing investment requirements. With 
this reduction in investment requirements, more output can be diverted to consumption. 
We assume that the economy is always in the steady-state, closed, and that there is no 
technical change. That is, we assume that when the support ratios and the labor force growth rates 
change, the economy transitions immediately from one steady-state to another. The familiar 
equation of consumption equals output minus investment (see Barro and Sali-i-Martin, 1995) for 
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consumption per capita is then: 
c = oc[f(k)-nk-6k], 
where 8 is the constant depreciation rate, assumed to be 0.13.9 
Re-writing the expression to find the change in steady-state consumption for changes in 
a and n: 
Ac / c = Act / a - a(k / c)An 
with c, k, and a evaluated at the initial steady-state (actual values in 1998). This equation captures 
the two offsetting effects of demographic change. A decline the support ratio reduces the level of 
per capita consumption that is feasible given the economy's output. More specifically, in the 
steady-state, capital per labor and output per labor are constant. When the support ratio declines, 
the labor-population ratio declines, lowering the output per population ratio, which determines 
what consumption per capita level is feasible. 
At the same time, however, a decline in the growth rate of the labor force ( An < 0 ) 
permits more consumption for a given capital-output ratio. Maintaining constant capital intensity 
requires investment of k(n + 5). When n falls, less investment is necessary to equip workers with 
capital, allowing more output to be diverted to consumption. To quote Cutler, et. al. (1990), 
"society receives a 'consumption dividend' when it is able to invest less and still maintain a given 
level of per capita output." 
The size of these two offsetting effects are reported in Table 2, using the government's 
definition of the effective labor force, LF1. For every five year period 2000 to 2040, we show the 
9Hayashi (1986) has shown that depreciation in Japan is much higher than in other 
countries, and that the depreciation rate could be as high as 13 percent. 
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steady-state consumption per capita change associated with changes in n (column a), changes in 
a (column b), and the combined effect (column b-a). The results are presented in annualized 
terms; a 1 percent decline is a decline of 1 percent per year. 
The combined effect, or the total change in per capita consumption, fluctuates widely. Per 
capita consumption is estimated to grow from 2000 to 2010, decline sharply from 2010 to 2020, 
modestly increase from 2020 to 2035, then decline sharply again. From 2035, per capita 
consumption will be declining at about 1.5 percent per year. The first effect, that of dependency, 
always exerts a negative influence, especially strongly between 2010 and 2020, and after 2035. A 
rise in dependency lowers output, leaving less output to be consumed by each person. 
The second effect, that of the consumption dividend, is both negative and positive, 
depending on the year. The consumption dividend effect is determined by the deceleration of the 
labor force. Although the labor force is continuously declining between 2000 and 2040, the rate 
of decline alternates between positive and negative. It is the rate of decline that influences the 
sign and magnitude of the consumption dividend. Between 2000 and 2010, the decline in the 
labor force growth rate is especially large, lowering investment requirements, and allowing more 
output for consumption. Between 2010 and 2020, however, the labor force growth rate increases 
(An > 0), raising investment requirements and contributing to the sharp decline in per capita 
consumption. Between 2020 and 2035, the labor force growth rate declines again, helping to raise 
per capita consumption. Finally, from 2035, both the consumption dividend and dependency 
effects contribute to the decline in per capita consumption. 
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Given our steady-state and closed-economy assumptions, it can be shown that the gross 
investment (saving) rate is: 
I/Y = (n + 5)K/Y . 
The equation says that the investment rate must be sufficient to keep the capital-output ratio 
constant. Output grows at the rate, n + 8; thus the capital stock must also increase by n + 6. This 
increase can be ensured by an investment rate of (n + 5)K / Y . 
Under the government's demographic projections (LF1), changes in n are not expected to 
substantially alter the annual investment rates (Table 2, last column). This is because changes in 
n (at 1 percent to 2 percent) are small relative to I/Y (at around 30 percent). Over the next 10 
years, investment rates will fall by about 2 percentage points, as the growth in the labor force 
declines (An < 0 ). With lower labor force growth, less investment is required to maintain a given 
capital-output ratio. 
In this Section, we showed that the demographic shifts underway in Japan will lead to 
significant shifts in per capita consumption growth rates. Per capita consumption will rise 
0 
moderately until 2010, then fall sharply between 2010 and 2020. From 2035, per capita 
consumption will again fall sharply. 
IV. Demographic Change and the Optimal Saving-Investment Balance. 
The results presented so far suggest that projected changes in demographics—changes in 
the labor force and in dependency-will in the long-run (post-2035) lower per capita consumption 
levels. However, we made several unrealistic assumptions in achieving these results- that the 
economy is always in steady-state, and that total saving always equals total investment (closed 
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economy). Here, we allow the economy time to transition between steady-states when 
demographic conditions change, and allow the economy to lend to and borrow from the rest of the 
world. We adopt the neoclassical framework and assume that consumers maximize (lifetime) 
utility, and firms maximize firm value. Unlike in the model of the previous section, in this model, 
households base their consumption on both current and future income. Thus, consumption can be 
detached from current income; households adjust their saving to keep consumption growth 
constant into the future. 
Specifically, in our simulations, we adopt the standard small country, open capital markets 
Ramsey optimal growth model (Barro and Sali-i-Martin, 1995, chapter 3). With the model, we 
can examine how a society should adjust its optimal saving and investment rate policies in 
response to changes in demographic variables. We simulate the model using plausible parameter 
values and the projected future paths of the support ratio and the growth in the labor force. Given 
our perfect international capital mobility and small country assumptions, the determination of 
optimal saving and investment rates can be analyzed separately. 
Optimal Investment Rates. 
We assume that firms maximize the present discounted value of profits: 
V = p e - n [ Y t - w t L t - - a d c t ] d T , (1) 
where Yt is gross output, r is the world real rate of interest, wt is wages, Lt is the effective labor 
force, and adct are adjustment costs to changing the capital stock, such as retooling and 
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downtime. 
Effective labor and capital grow according to: 
L,=L0e<°.*«' (2) 
^ - - . - a - . CJ> 
where n t is the rate of labor supply growth, g is the constant rate of labor augmenting technical 
progress, I t is the gross investment rate, and 5 is the constant depreciation rate. 
We maximize (1), given the constraints (2) and (3), and simulate the model, using 
plausible parameter values. For g and r, we take 0.012 and 0.06 (from Jorgenson and Nishimizu, 
1979), and for 8 , 0.13. Labor augmenting technical progress of 1.2 percent implies a growth rate 
of total factor productivity of 2 percent. For the path of n t , we use values from the government's 
labor force projections (LF1). Details of the simulation are given in Appendix 1. 
Table 3 depicts the projected investment rates from 2000 to 2040; the values for the 
investment rates are normalized so that the investment rate for 2000 is equal to the actual value of 
29 percent (in 1998). From the Table, we can see that the total investment rate remains close to 
its current level. The investment rate rises slightly from 2000 until 2025, but always remains 
close to the 2000 rate of 29 percent. The investment rate is not sensitive to changes in n, although 
it is quite sensitive to changes in r (which is assumed constant). A fall in n lowers both output 
and the capital needed to equip workers, leaving the capital-labor ratio steady. With a steady 
capital-labor ratio, the investment rate is also steady (see Section HI). 
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Optimal Saving Rates. 
The saving rate is determined from "forward-looking" household behavior. Assume that 
households wish to maximize their lifetime utility, U, given by: 
r e 1 " 9 * 
U = f - e^e-P'dt, (4) 
J (1-9) 
where c is consumption per capita, z is the rate of growth in population, 1 / 9 , is the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution, and p is the pure rate of time preference. This formulation of household 
preferences assumes that households are dynastic-they care about their children's, and 
grandchildren's welfare (utility) as much as their own.10 
The budget constraint for households (in per capita terms) is: 
at = atwt + rat - ct - ztat, (5) 
where at is total assets per person or capita. This budget constraint says that growth in assets (per 
person) is higher, the higher the wages, w t , the support ratio, a t , and the interest rate, r. The 
growth in assets per person is lower, the higher the consumption, and the population growth rate, 
10There is a large literature testing whether the dynastic model is applicable for Japan (for 
a review, see Horioka, 1993). The dynastic model can be contrasted with the life-cycle model, in 
which households do not care about their children. Thus, in the life-cycle model households 
bring down their wealth (dissave) in old age. On the whole, the empirical tests support the 
dynastic model, and reject the life cycle model. The Japanese elderly, on average, leave large 
bequests to their children, and this bequest giving appears to be motivated by altruism towards 
the next generation. 
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z t . Note that — = nt - zt; that is, the change in the support ratio is equal to the labor force growth 
at 
rate minus the population growth rate. 
From (4) and (5), we explicitly simulate the growth and level of per capita consumption 
and the saving rate, using plausible values for the parameters 0 and p and the government's 
demographic projections (LF1) for nt and zt (and thus, a t ) . Details are given in Appendix 2. 
Table 3 depicts the projected optimal saving rates from 2000 to 2040. The optimal saving 
rate declines a few percent to 24 percent until 2025. The saving rate stabilizes at about that level 
until 2035, when it resumes its decline. This pattern is a result of shifts in the support ratio. As 
shown in Appendix 2, optimal consumption per capita always grows at a constant rate of g (=1.2 
percent), but output per capita growth is affected by shifts in the support ratio (as in Section III). 
As the support ratio declines between 2000 and 2025, output per capita falls, the consumption-
output ratio rises, and the saving rate falls. 
In this section, we showed that consumption per capita will grow steadily at 1.2 percent 
every year. In the previous section, we showed that consumption per capita growth will fluctuate. 
Households consume a fraction of their current income, and when their current income fluctuates, 
their consumption fluctuates. Here, given "forward-looking" households, consumption can be 
detached from current income. Thus, households prefer to smooth their consumption, and 
therefore adjust their saving rates to keep the consumption growth rate constant. Thus, when 
output per capita rises, the saving rate will rise, as households save some of the output for 
consumption in future periods. In the model of the previous section, households are, in effect, 
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prevented from adjusting their saving rates to smooth their consumption. Thus, consumption per 
capita tends to move in the same direction as output per capita. 
The results of this section suggest that future demographic trends will affect the optimal 
saving rate much more than the optimal investment rate. In an open-economy, investment rates 
are primarily determined by international real interest rates, which are set mainly outside of Japan, 
and not by domestic demographic variables. Thus, future Japanese net exports will be determined 
largely by movements in Japanese saving. The optimal saving response using the government's 
demographic projection is a gradual and continuous decline in the saving rate until 2040. 
Net Export Surpluses and Net Foreign Debt. 
From our simulated path of saving and investment rates, we can simulate the 
future path of the net export surplus, and net foreign debt. 
The net export surplus-GDP ratio is equal to: 
NXt St It 
Yt ~ Yt Yt ' 
and the current account surplus (change in net foreign debt)-GDP ratio is equal to: 
- D t N X t r*Dt 
Yt Yt Yt ' 
where Dt is net foreign debt, and -rDt is net factor income received from abroad. 
Table 3 depicts the trends in the net export surplus-GDP ratio. Corresponding to the 
decline in the saving rate, Japan's net export surpluses will continue to decline, and will turn 
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negative in 2015. By 2040, Japan's net export deficits will almost be 10 percent of GDP. 
Table 3 also depicts the trends in the net foreign debt-GDP ratio, and the current account-
GDP ratio. Japan's net foreign assets (= -net foreign debt) to GDP ratio will peak at 95 percent in 
2025. That is, Japan should continue to be a large foreign asset holder for the foreseeable future. 
Although net exports become negative by 2015, the current account is positive until 2025, owing 
to interest income receipts on net foreign assets. However, as net export deficits continue to 
mount, the current account turns negative. Correspondingly, net foreign assets start to decline in 
2025. 
Demographic Change and Economic Size. 
In the simulations of this section, we showed that despite the population aging, Japan's per 
capita consumption will continue to rise. Optimizing households will lower their saving, so that 
per capita consumption will grow at a constant 1.6 percent per year. 
In addition to the level and growth in per capita consumption, countries may care about the 
absolute size in GDP. A large country like the United States and Germany enjoys greater 
international power and prestige than a small country, rich in per capita terms like Sweden or 
Singapore. Because of Japan's slowing labor force growth, Japan's GDP level and economic size 
will in the future grow more slowly. 
Table 3 shows Japan's economic size, assuming the government's labor force projections 
and annual total factor productivity growth of 2 percent (corresponding to labor-augmenting 
technical progress, g=1.2 percent). Between 2000 and 2020, Japan's total GDP will grow at an 
average rate of 1.2 percent per year. All of this growth is propelled by the growth in total factor 
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productivity of 2 percent. The decline in the labor force subtracts 0.8 percent a year from total 
GDP growth. 
Demographic Change and Fiscal Policy. 
Earlier in this section, we showed that "forward-looking" households will gradually lower 
their saving rates. So far, we have been silent about the split between government and private 
saving. The model above assumes 'Ricardian Equivalence,' that households pierce the 
'government veil.' That is, when government deficits rise, private saving will increase to offset 
the deficits, to keep total saving rates along the optimal path. 
Slower GDP growth and population aging are expected to significantly worsen Japanese 
government fiscal positions over the next 25 years. Tax revenues will fall and public pension 
benefits will rise (Takayama, 1998). Masson and Tryon (1990) find that between 2000 and 2025, 
the budget deficit will deteriorate by -2.5 percentage points, owing to increasing pension burdens. 
Takayama (1998) projects similarly large budget deficits. The Japan Center for Economic 
Research (2000) estimates that the government saving-GDP ratio will decline from 2 percent in 
1998 to -2.4 percent of GDP by 2025. These high rates of government dissaving over the next 
few decades imply that if households want to smooth their consumption into the indefinite future, 
they will have to keep private saving rates high, perhaps close to today's level of 29 percent. 
Comparison with Earlier Projections of the Japanese Saving-Investment Balance. 
Unlike this paper, most earlier projections of the Japanese saving-investment balance 
are not based explicitly on "forward-looking" behavior by firms and households. Horioka (1991, 
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1992) using reduced-form time-series econometrics, estimates that Japanese private saving will 
become -15 percent by 2020. Noguchi (1989) finds that the aging will cause the ratio of 
investment to GDP to decline until 2015, and increase thereafter. The primary reason for the 
decline is the fall in the working-age population and the resultant decline in the labor force. 
Noguchi's results further indicate that between 2000 and 2015, the decline in the saving rate will 
exceed that in the investment rate. Thus, his results imply that Japan's net export surplus will 
widen between 2000 and 2015, but it will narrow after 2015, despite the fact that the saving rate 
will continue its decline. 
Auerbach et. al.'s (1989) model is noteworthy in that it is based on an explicit utility 
maximization framework, although details of their model differ from those of the model adopted 
here. They find that Japan's net exports will narrow until 2030, becoming negative in 2030, and 
widen anew after 2030, eventually reaching its long-run level of 2.3 percent of GDP. 
With regards to more recent projections, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2000) 
estimates that in 2005, the Japanese total saving rate will be 29.5 percent, with the private and 
public saving rates at 24.2 percent and 5.4 percent, respectively. The IMF estimates that in 2005, 
private investment will be 26.3 percent. The Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER) (2000) 
estimates that in 2005, private and public saving will be 8.3 percent and -2.0 percent, respectively. 
The JCER estimates that in 2025, private and public saving will be 3.7 percent and -2.4 percent. 
Finally, the JCER estimates that between 2015 and 2025, there will be no growth in real per capita 
consumption. Both the IMF and JCER projections are based on traditional large scale macro 
econometric models. 
Thus, although the details of the earlier projections differ, they all appear to project 
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declining future saving rates, stable investment rates, and growing current account deficits. The 
earlier research also projects no growth in per capita consumption, especially after 2015. 
V. Conclusion. 
The rapid aging of the population currently underway in Japan-Japan's demographic 
destiny-should lead to narrowing current account surpluses over the next 25 years. The current 
account will turn to deficit in 2025, and the deficit will continue to widen between 2025 and 2040. 
Although investment rates will remain close to current rates of 29 percent, saving rates will 
decline from today's 31 percent to 24 percent in 2025, and 20 percent in 2040. 
We project that despite the population aging, per capita consumption will grow until 2010. 
What happens after 2010 depends on the assumptions behind the projections. If we assume that 
households consume based only on their current income, then after 2010, consumption per capita 
falls in most years. If we assume that households are "forward looking," consumption and current 
income can be detached. Households can keep their consumption growth positive and constant 
indefinitely into the future by lowering their saving rates. 
Admittedly, the assumptions underlying our projections are somewhat stylized and special. 
For example, in our open economy model, we assumed that real interest rates are determined 
internationally, and are exogenous to Japan. However, since Japan is a large capital exporter, if 
Japanese saving, say, increases, international real interest rates may fall, resulting in endogenous 
real interest rates. Endogenous international real interest rates generally imply that saving and 
investment rates move closer together, which may imply an upper limit to future Japanese current 
account deficits. 
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where nt is the rate of labor supply growth, which in our framework changes over time, g is the 
constant rate of labor augmenting technical progress, It is the gross investment rate, and 5 is the 
constant depreciation rate. 
In addition, it is assumed that firms face adjustments costs to changing their capital stock 
such as retooling and downtime: 
adjcost = I*[l + b / 2 * I / K ] . 
We assume that firms maximize the present discounted value of profits: 
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The optimal paths of the capital stock per effective labor and the shadow value of capital 
(Tobin's q) are: 
\ 
— = i - ( g + n + 8)*k = [ ( q - l ) / b - ( g + n + 8)]*k (A3) 
dt 
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within any five year interval, say 2005 to 2010, nt is constant. As it turned out, given our 
parameter values, new steady-states were reached in about 5 years for all nt. For example, 
between 2050 and 2045, nt is projected by the government to be -0.013 per year. With this nt, 
and the steady-state values of k and q from (A5) and (A6), and the equations of motion (A3) and 
(A4), steady-states of k2045 and q2045 were reached in about 5 years. Now with these k2045 and 
q2045 as starting values, with nt again projected to be -0.013 between 2045 and 2040, steady-states 
of k2040 and q2040 were achieved in 2040, and so on. This process was repeated every five years 
until 2000. 
.A 
Finally, from the paths of kt and q, we can calculate investment per effective labor (from 
(A3)), and output per effective labor (from the production function), and thereby calculate the 
investment rate (investment/output). 
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Appendix 2: Simulation of the Optimal Saving Rate. 
From (4) and (5) in the text, it can be shown that the growth in per capita consumption is 
constant and equal to: 
£
 = ^ * ( r - p ) 
c 0 
and that consumption per capita at time 0 (in our case, the year 2000), depends in a complicated 
way on the parameters of the consumption problem, and the entire future paths of nt, at , and 
w t : 
c(0) = f(r,p,9,nt,at,wt), 
fort=l...oo. 
For convenience, rather than simulating the path of consumption per capita, we actually 
simulate the path of consumption per effective labor, c t . In addition, to prevent consumption per 
effective labor from approaching zero asymptotically, we assume that r = p + 0g . In this case, it 
dct —ctt 
can be shown from (4) and (5) in the text that along the optimal path, — L = — - . Thus, 
c t oct 
consumption per effective labor falls when the support ratio rises. 
For parameter values, we assume that 0 = 3 , and p = 0.024 , and that the projected 
demographic values for 2050 persist as the economy's final steady-state. Finally, using our 
consumption per effective labor and output per effective labor (from Appendix 1) projections, we 
simulate the future path of the optimal saving rate. We assume that the projection paths of nt and 
z t have already been anticipated by households in the year 2000 (1998, in the actual data). Thus, 
the simulated values for optimal consumption and saving in 2000 are the actual values. 
In the Table, the saving rate moves in the same direction as the support ratio. The 
intuition is the following. With the assumption r = p + 0g, we can show that from 2000, 
consumption per capita growth will be constant at g. Since consumption per capita growth is 
constant, fluctuations in the optimal saving rates must be driven by fluctuations in output per 
capita. A fall in the support ratio lowers output per capita, raises the consumption-output ratio, 
and lowers the saving rate. In turn, a rise in the support ratio raises the saving rate by the same 
mechanism. Thus, the optimal saving rate moves in the same direction as the support ratio. 
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